Security - An Everlasting Wait for A Ray of Hope that Has Yet to Shine

(Part I)

The main reasons why no government ever gained legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans and even the international community after Sardar Daud Khan’s government overturn and prior to the Bonn Agreement were that the governments were forced on people, they failed to establish the basic level of security (not even desirable), weren’t by/of/for governments or they were run by those who did not hesitate in violating human rights, which is no secret to anyone.

 After the Bonn Agreement was signed and an interim government was established in 2001, Afghanistan had a lifetime opportunity to establish and strengthen the weakened to nonexistent security infrastructure of Afghanistan, which President Karzai wasted in dealing with the figures who were not so favored by the international community or were headaches. Moreover, the key international ally, the United States of America, turned its face to Iraq, a deep dark well.

 Today, even with an internationally-recognized and a so-called nationally-united government that claims to be by, of and for people and the one that deliberately overlooks the heinous past of the human rights violators in the pretext of national reconciliation and after irresponsible use of billions of dollars and the begging of the president to the Taliban for reconciliation, something that the Afghan government along with its international allies have not even come closer to securing is security itself. The million dollar question is why the hundreds of thousands international and national troops with unprecedented resources can’t secure a country which is more or less the size of California? That is a question that the international community needs to ask itself while we will have a glance at security and what it means to Afghans and why they think security has deteriorated in the recent years.  

 “Security means not having major economic, social and political problems” said one of the interviewees in a research conducted by Human Rights Research & Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC) and two of the basic reasons for the deteriorating security were identified “poverty” and “unemployment in the same report, which leads us to believe that an average Afghan has broadened his/her horizons and can see farther than Taliban, Al-Qaeda, suicide attacks, drugs and son and so forth as far as security is concerned. According to people, the worsening of the security situation is as result of the following failures:

1. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Failure: DDR and DIAG have been more of a publicity stunt for the Afghan government and the international community and an easy money opportunity for the DDR’ed and DIAG’ed militias than what they should really have been. Despite the DDR and DIAG efforts, which have been going on for over 5 years, neither have all the guns been collected nor has the number of guns been reduced. According to an international research conducted in Afghanistan, at least, 2000 unruly and disruptive armed groups wander across the country, 100 of which are on their toes to get in action at any given time. They are responsible for kidnappings, homicide, mugging, armed robbery etc. They have spread an atmosphere of fear and terror in parts of the country, which affects an average Afghan and curtails development efforts in the victimized parts. DDR has failed in its “reintegration” stages the most as neither the government nor the English-&-computer-dominated private sector was ready to fully integrate these militias. The institutions that were established to employ these militias or teach them vocations were mostly short-term efforts just like the money and the other aid offered to the DDR’ed militias. When a government offers a lot of money and aid without a long-term solution (creating long-term jobs etc) to a massive effort like DDR that affects the whole nation and with penalty measures equal to zero to establish the rule of law, the outcome of such plans is not only counterproductive but also backfires as it has. Did anyone think about what would happen when the money and the temporary jobs dry up for these militias? And what would happen if after learning a vocational trade, the militias did not know how to manage a business?

1. Arming New Militias:

 As if the failure of DDR and DIAG weren’t enough of a lesson, the international forces decided to arm tribal leaders and local people to so-called protect themselves from and fight against the Taliban and insurgents, who are still vaguely defined by both the Afghan government and its international allies, for a few dollars. This measure was taken after more than two decades of its failure during Dr. Najibullah’s presidency. Dr. Najibullah was disappointed by the by-then militias as not only did they not fight against the Mujahideen but also used the by-then modern weaponry of the government against them. Afghans follow culture for most of their lives, especially when it comes to waging war. Afghans have the tendency to support their own people no matter how wrong they are than to support the foreigners no matter how right they are. Don’t doubt the judgment of Afghans. It is just that Afghans come from a culture and religion-oriented society wherein values, practices, needs, demands and goals are interwoven and intersect at some point. Moreover, the experiences of the British and Soviet occupations are still afresh in the minds of the Afghans. It is needless to say that the present international forces have given Afghans enough reasons to turn their backs against them and even join the Taliban. On another note, what is the guarantee that these non-uniformed, free-spirited men want to take up guns to only protect themselves and not settle old scores/family feuds with their enemies who live in their localities? What is the guarantee that these men will not join the Taliban/insurgents when the NATO/ISAF trained and uniformed Afghan police have joined the Taliban/insurgents already in different parts of the country? What is the guarantee that they will only use their arms against the Taliban/insurgents and not terrify or intimidate the locals for their own interests? “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.”  Are we fooling ourselves unintentionally or deliberately? The real solution could be increasing the number of the police, building their capacities and providing them with enough resources to handle the rule-of-law and make a living without having to be corrupt.

 In conclusion, the failure of DDR and DIAG greatly undermine the development efforts in Afghanistan. If after millions of dollars has been spent to take away the guns, but we still see guns and thousands of armed groups wandering around the country, it is certainly appalling. The government and the international community have to take DIAG more seriously and focus more on it from the rule-of-law standpoint than that of a militia ATM. Push has come to shove and serious and practical measures have to be taken. Or else, irreversible and unimaginable deeds will be in store for Afghanistan. Last but not the least, arming militias was a failed attempt decades ago and although it may seem functioning and bringing about short-term results, in the long run, it will be a bigger failure than it was decades ago

(This is a three-part article. The next two parts will be published in the next editions).

By: Zaid E