Last week, we discussed the Afghans’ concerns vis-à-vis the foreign forces operations in Afghanistan and how drugs and the economy are responsible for security deterioration in Afghanistan. This week, we will talk about the Afghan police force or the ANP (Afghan National Police) and the security of the children.  

A. Afghan National Police (ANP)

 In a perfect world, when we hear the word “security”, the word “police” crosses our mind instantly, but if we think about security in Afghanistan, we start counting: ISAF, NATO, ANA, ANP, NSD, local militias/auxiliary militias and many more simply because there are too many variables that play their roles in the Afghan security.

The police are the most vulnerable force in Afghanistan. They are in the frontlines of the attacks and the softest targets for the Taliban/insurgents as they are deployed in almost all corners of the cities and on highways. Mostly, they are not equipped with bulletproof vests, warm clothing, proper and secure barricades, food and weaponry. With all that in mind, if an Afghan agrees to join the police force with the sole motive of securing Afghanistan, he/she is the bravest Afghan and the one to be respected and loved by all.

“The Afghan police give the most sacrifices, yet their reputation is questioned all the time.” Said the Minister of Interior Atmar in one of his interviews in the United States, which proves that the Afghan police force is of variable quality: the ones that sacrifice their lives (the heroes) and the ones that compromise the reputation of the police by taking bribe, behaving unjustly etc (the traitors).

The followings are the reasons why after so many years of reestablishment and sacrifices, still, the Afghans are not satisfied with the police efforts:

1. Lack of Proper Schooling:

 Most of the new and young recruits are the products of the crash courses provided by the Ministry of Interior. Today securing the “officer” rank has become so easy that even a high school graduate can secure it. There was a time when not everyone could join the police force. However, today, not everyone wants to join the police. The foundation of strong police institutions was dismantled during the different wars in Afghanistan and has yet to be established due to unparalleled security deterioration over the last 4 years. Worse than that is the existence of illiterate police recruits. With the low level of schooling or with no schooling, how can a police officer know what the rights of the citizens are and what his limitations are? Much less we talk about “complex issues”, such as human rights, felony, misdemeanor, fraction etc. Educated people will only join the police force if the police salaries are raised considerably, which do not seem likely considering the current budget of the ANP and/or make joining the police compulsory.

2. Corruption:

 Corruption has undermined the whole reconstruction effort in Afghanistan and has cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of the Afghan government. When a country’s police, in particular, get corrupted, the pillars of almost all other foundations waggle. Corruption in the police may result in the thieves, muggers, robbers, assassins, kidnappers, extortionists, rapists, looters, Taliban/insurgents, government corrupt officials and lawbreakers get away with their crimes. Moreover, the strong religious and culture values for which Afghanistan stands will be done away with the shower of money.

 Another major underlying cause of corruption in police is their low salaries. The insufficiency of their salaries and the existence of a huge scope for corruption tempt almost every police officer to get corrupted. In the in-depth interviews carried by HRRAC researchers for the “Afghan Perception of Insecurity”, some of the low-ranking police officers revealed that corruption was institutionalized and that even honest police officers were often compelled to act according to their corrupt supervisors’ orders.

 If rumors are to be believed, it is said that at one point, the police chief (district-level) positions were auctioned for a $100,000. If it is not a rumor, it means that the district police chiefs paid $100,000 each, which they could not make in their lifetime service with legit money. So, why did they invest so much money when the salability of their jobs gave them no job security? After investing $100,000, they surely wanted to make another $100,000 or even more as profit. Figuring out the rest does not require a rocket scientist and expecting just behavior, honesty and professionalism from them is utter naivety.

 Although it may sound a bit odd, having the police officers go through a lie-detecting test at the time of their recruitment to determine whether they want to join the police force for under the table deals or to provide real services and making it an off-and-on and on need-basis discipline will do a world of good both to the ministry and the average public. The lie-detecting test will prevent almost all the corruption in the police. Yes! Lie detecting tests could be passed even if one lies, but since the technology is fairly recent and almost nonexistent to Afghans, it will take them a long time to figure it out. Moreover, there is strong possibility that the Ministry of Interior will be free of corrupt officers by then.

3. Ties & Connections:

 Generally speaking, Afghans have extensive familial, provincial, ethnic and religious ties, which make Afghanistan even smaller than it already is. This culture-oriented nature of Afghans is praiseworthy. However, when it comes to the police, these ties and connections have a negative impact. For example, a police officer finds it very difficult to act neutral and be just to an Afghan who has a problem with another Afghan who happens to be (even) his third or fourth cousin. The police officer has to act in favor of his third/fourth cousin as he is answerable to his relatives and does not want to bear enmity with them.

 The connections circle is vast. If a police officer, regardless of his rank, has connections with an influential warlord or a powerful figure, how fair is he going to act in a murder case where the culprit is the son of the aforementioned warlord or powerful figure? Worse case scenario: how is a provincial chief of police going to handle the rule of law if he is appointed by the recommendation of a local warlord? 

 HRRAC’s “Afghan Perception of Security” suggests that the “confidence in law enforcement bodies remain low and the people’s distrust of police integrity and abilities considerably increases when issues such as ethnicity and socioeconomic class are considered”.

 Cutting the Afghan ties and connections is next to impossible. However, filling the key police positions of one province with officers from other provinces and rotating them on a regular yet long-term basis will probably make it less complicated for the police to be just. Again, the lie-detectors can help with this problem, too.

 The aforementioned HRRAC report summarized corruption and the unjustness of the police in the following calculation:

 Unjust behavior of the police = high/low level corruption + ethnic bias + loyalty to ex-commanders

B. The Security of Children:

The most valued assets of an Afghan are his/her children. However, kidnapping for extortion and the dying of children in the suicide attacks are of great concerns to the parents. According to HRRAC’s “Afghans Perception of Insecurity” report, parents aren’t at ease with their children walking to school. They are afraid something is going to happen to them as Afghans have experienced it.

Most of the (affluent) Afghans opt for private schools simply because they provide transportation. The kidnapping of the kids for ransom is a terrifying issue for the Afghan businessmen and affluent people that the Afghan government hasn’t been able to tackle with completely. Most Afghans use this insecurity as a yardstick to measure security in the country. The insecurity of kids means an insecure next generation, which Afghanistan cannot afford. There has to be stronger measures taken against the kidnappers and the punishment should be more severe so that people should not even think of kidnapping one’s beloved one(s) for money.

This three-part article was a HRRAC effort to address the major security issues and the suggestions of the average public for betterment. We hope that the concerned security institutions, at both national and international levels, give an ear to them, at the least.